Official foreign observers and officials of various foreign governments who participated in various conferences here in seeding to avoid the, outbreak of local hostilities, agree that the Japanese exhibited the utmost restraint under provocation, even for several days keeping all of the Japanese landed force off the streets and strictly within their own barracks, although the move somewhat endangered Japanese lives and properties.
"Opinions may differ regarding the responsibility for the opening of hostilities in the vicinity of Peiping early In July" said one foreign official who was a participant in the conferences held here before Aug. 13, "but concerning the Shanghai hostilities the records will justify only one decision. The Japanese did not want a repetition of the fighting here and exhibited forbearance and patience and did everything possible to avoid aggravating the situation. But they were literally pushed into the clash by the Chinese, who seemed intent on involving the foreign area and foreign interests in this clash."
出典：「Japan in China」1938年Ｋ・カール・カワカミ
邦訳は「シナ大陸の真相」展転社、福井雄三訳]]>蒋介石の日本租界攻撃計画? 実はとっくに自白していたhttp://news-hassin.sejp.net/?eid=8908742008-04-27T22:25:00+09:002008-04-27T13:25:01Z2008-04-27T13:25:00Z『抗戦簡史』 中華民国国防部史政処編 和訳は防衛庁防衛研究所戦史室篇 「戦史叢書 支那事変陸軍作戦」280ページより
民国二十四年冬、張治中にひそかに命じて南京、上海方面の抗戦工事を準備させ、戦争を避けることができなくなったとき、わが方は優勢な兵力をも...史実を世界に発信する会事務局
民国二十四年冬、張治中にひそかに命じて南京、上海方面の抗戦工事を準備させ、戦争を避けることができなくなったとき、わが方は優勢な兵力をもって敵の不意に出て、上海の敵全部を殲滅してこれを占領し、爾後、敵の増援を不可能にしようと企図した。このため呉淞・上海周辺の各要点にひそかに堅固な工事を築き、わが大軍の集中を掩護させ、更に常熟、呉県において洋澄湖・澱山湖を利用し、堅強の主陣地帯（呉福陣地）を、また江陰-無錫間に後方陣地帯(錫澄陣地)を構築した。
民国二十五年、幹部参謀旅行演習を実施するとともに、龍華、徐家匯、紅橋、北新?、真茹、閘北停車場、江湾、大場江湾、大場の各要点に包囲攻撃陣地を構築し、呉福〔呉江−福山〕陣地の増強、京滬〔南京-上海〕鉄道の改築、後方自動車道路の建設、長江防備及び交通通信の改善、民衆の組織訓練等を実施した。 敵は、わが方がひそかに工事を実施しているのを察知すると、六カ国共同委員会の開催を要求し各国の同情を得ようとしたが、わが代表の反対により何の結論もなく散会した。]]>和訳できましたhttp://news-hassin.sejp.net/?eid=8873162008-04-23T17:21:59+09:002008-04-23T08:21:59Z2008-04-23T08:21:59Z”the Sino-German Connection”
by Hsi-Huey Liang, 1977 Van Gorcum & Comp. B.V.
Distributed in the USA by Humanities Press
ISBN 90 232 1554 0
104頁
日中の長い軍事的対立の中で、岐路となる瞬間が近づいていた。
ファルケンハウゼンは極めて慎重な男だった...史実を世界に発信する会事務局
by Hsi-Huey Liang, 1977 Van Gorcum & Comp. B.V.
Distributed in the USA by Humanities Press
ISBN 90 232 1554 0
126-127頁
中国にとって、もう一つの重要なドイツ人組織である「ドイツ軍事顧問団」からの支援は絶対的なものであった。
ドイツ軍事顧問団は、盧溝橋事件の発生後、時をおかずベルリンに対して、「乗るべき馬を間違えるな」という警告を発している。１９３７年７月２１日、南京のドイツ大使館は、ファルケンハウゼンがブロンベルク国防大臣に宛てて発した、次のような緊急電を取り次いでいる。
「蒋介石は開戦を決意した。これは局地戦ではなく、全面戦争（総力戦）である。中国側の勝算はかなりある。なぜなら、日本はソ連の介入を恐れており、中国戦線に全軍を投入できないからだ。中国軍の歩兵部隊は精強で、空軍は日本と互角である。日本側の勝利は覚束ない。中国軍の士気は高く、困難な闘いに挑む用意がある。」
１９３７年７月２７日、ドイツ外務省は東京の使節に対して、中国からの軍事顧問団の撤収は現時点において考慮の外であると通達した。このような状況下において顧問団を引き上げることは、今回の紛争において、中国に敵対する立場をとることと同義だからである。さらに、軍事顧問団を引き上げれば、代わりにソ連の軍事顧問が中国に招聘されることになる。ところが、当該通達はさらに続けて、ドイツ外務省が駐ベルリン日本大使・武者小路に対し、「ドイツ人顧問は戦闘に参加しない」と言明した事実も伝えていた。
しかし実際には、軍事顧問団には戦争を回避するつもりなど全くなかった。表向き、駐華大使トラウトマンはドイツ人将校らに対し、中国側に立った戦闘参加を禁じた。しかし、ファルケンハウゼンは後にこう書いている。
「我々は、中国に雇用された民間人なのだから、中国の友人を見殺しにして撤退するなど論外だということは皆了解していた。したがって、私はドイツ人の顧問を必要なら何処へでも派遣したし、その多くは最前線であった。」
ファルケンハウゼンは日本の侵攻をずっと前から予期しており、敵軍の攻撃開始のかなり前から中国軍を防衛配置につかせていた。
ファルケンハウゼンは、１９３７年の春に再度、中国側から対日戦争を仕掛けることを真剣に検討すべきだと強く主張した。１９３７年３月９日、ファルケンハウゼンは、航空支援のもと塘沽、天津および北京を中国軍部隊が奇襲占領する計画を立案した。
「留意すべきなのは、この作戦は、まちがいなく戦争を意味するということだ。中国の指導者が、真に戦いを覚悟したときにのみ、この作戦は実行可能である。しかし同時に、この断固たる決断を行えば、万里の長城に至る河北省全土の制圧が可能であり、最低でも塘沽・天津・北京を結ぶ鉄道と要地を占領できることは明らかである。」
]]>【資料】蒋介石の日本租界攻撃計画http://news-hassin.sejp.net/?eid=8846772008-04-20T11:32:49+09:002008-04-20T02:32:49Z2008-04-20T02:32:49Zようやく打ち込みの時間ができました。
和訳もあとで追加する予定です。
出典：”the Sino-German Connection”
by Hsi-Huey Liang, 1977 Van Gorcum & Comp. B.V.
Distributed in the USA by Humanities Press
ISBN 90 232 1554 0
p.104
A decisive moment i...史実を世界に発信する会事務局
和訳もあとで追加する予定です。
出典：”the Sino-German Connection”
by Hsi-Huey Liang, 1977 Van Gorcum & Comp. B.V.
Distributed in the USA by Humanities Press
ISBN 90 232 1554 0
p.104
A decisive moment in the long military confrontation of China and Japan was imminent, and Falkenhausen, this so circumspect man, decided on defiance as China’s only course in the face of approaching defeat.
In April, 1936, he was in effect advising the Chinese to make war on Japan.
Until now Japan’s tactics, or rather the tactics of the Japanese Kwantung Army, and of its organs Doihara, Isogai etc., was marked by avoidance of risks. All their demands on China were enforced by the mere threat of military sanctions. But now that the Chinese will of resistance has grown, a new situation has arisen. China’s absolute will of resistance need not take the form of a sudden break [with Japan], which is equivalent to war. The absolute will of resistance can at first be applied to places where any further concession is quite unjustifiable. [But] it is [also] clear that this situation of no return has already been reached and even surpassed almost everywhere. Japan is beginning to see that she cannot proceed further without risks to herself. China must use each day that she has to improve her defensive forces.
If China was to make war on Japan, she was better off with the initiative on her side. In April, 1936, Falkenhausen counseled Chiang to make preparation for guerilla warfare in territories held by the enemy. More, he urged the Chinese to step up intelligence and sabotage work beyond the territory of China proper, in Manchuria and the Japanese homeland. Six months later, in October, 1936, Falkenhausen was recommending contingency plans for surprise attacks against the Japanese garrisons in the foreign concessions in Hankow and Shanghai. He followed this up, next month, with the proposal to counter-attack the Japanese in North China and to wrest Hopei from their control by means of large-scale infantry attacks with air support. Impresses by the progress of the Chinese Air Force, Falkenhausen in Novenber, 1936, asked for 108 war planes to restore Chinese control over the desert regions of Shansi and Ninghsia, and initiated plans for further Chinese air raids on Dairen, Taku, Shanhaikwan and the West coast of Korea.
To be sure, Falkenhausen’s aggressiveness was spurred by the collapse of South China’s resistance to Nanking as much as by the overwhelming threat of Japan.
p.126-127
There was unequivocal support for china by another important group of Germans in China, the Deutsche Beraterschaft. The German Military Mission lost no time after Lukuochiao to warn the Berlin Government against the risk of backing the wrong horse. On July 21, 1937, the German Embassy in Nanking conveyed this urgent message from Falkenhausen to Blomberg:
Chiang is determined to fight. This is not a local war but total war. China’s chances for victory are not bad because the Japanese – mindful of the threat of Russian intervention – cannot commit all their forces against the Chinese.
The Chinese infantry is good. The Chinese Air Force is about equal to the Japanese. A Japanese victory is far from certain. The morale of the Chinese Army is high. They will put up a bitter fight.
On July 27, 1937, the German A.A. had informed its envoy in Tokyo that there was no question at that moment of withdrawing the military advisers from China because at this juncture of affairs such a move would amount to taking sides in the conflict against China. Besides, it would cause the Chinese to invite Soviet military advisers to come in their place. However, the communication went on, the A.A. had assured the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, Mushakoji, that no German advisers would participate in the fighting.
In reality, the Beraterchaft had no intention of abstaining from the war. Trautmann officially notified the German officers that they were not to fight for the Chinese. “But we all agreed,” Falkenhausen later wrote, “that as private citizens in Chinese employment there could be no question of our leaving our Chinese friends to their fate. Therefore I assigned the German advisers wherever they were needed and that was often in the front lines.” Fankenhausen had long anticipated the Japanese invasion and positioned the Chinese armies in defense positions well in advance of the enemy’s attack. In the spring of 1937, he had once more urged the Chinese to consider starting the war on her side. On March 9, he outlined a plan for the sudden occupation of Tangku, Tiensin, and Peking by Chinese troops with air cover:
Let it be clear that such an operation inevitably means war. It can only be carried out if the leaders of China have truly decided to fight. But it is just as clear that by means of this determined initiative all Hopei up to the Great Wall could be taken, or at the very least the railway line Tangku–Tiensin –Peking-Kalgan with all its strong points.
●「天才・ユダヤ、達人・日本（下）」−助け合うアウトサイダー
人種差別の横行する国際情勢の中で、ユダヤ人と日本人は助け合って危機を乗り越えた
Genius Jews and Masterful Japanese-2
]]>よく分かる慰安婦問題http://news-hassin.sejp.net/?eid=8337482008-03-03T01:27:59+09:002008-03-02T16:28:00Z2008-03-02T16:27:59Z西岡力著『よくわかる慰安婦問題』（草思社）については、今年初めに全訳をサイトにアップしておりましたが、このたび海外特派員協会の会員に以下のプレスリリースを行いました。
同様のリリースは、日本国外務省、米連邦議会調査局、シーファー駐日大使に対しても送付し...史実を世界に発信する会事務局更新情報
同様のリリースは、日本国外務省、米連邦議会調査局、シーファー駐日大使に対しても送付しています。
February 25, 2008
< Press Release>
Behind the Comfort Women Controversy: How Lies Became Truth
by Nishioka Tsutomu, Professor at Tokyo Christian University
Prof. Nishioka Tsutomu, Deputy Chairman of the National Council for the Rescue of Japanese Abducted by North Korea is a well known researcher on Korean issues. Based on his wide expertise on Korea and direct contacts with Koreans concerned with the comfort women issue he published a book relating to the problem of the comfort women titled Yokuwakaru Ianfu Mondai (Soshisha, Tokyo) last year. The book concludes that the U. S. House Resolution adopted in July 2007 is political propaganda and that not one of its accusations is true.
We are happy to announce that a full English translation of this book is now available and uploaded on our web-site (http://www.sdh-fact.com/CL02_1/39_S4.pdf). We are confident that the book will be an eye-opener on the comfort women issue and, therefore, of great interest for all kindred spirits who have embraced the universal values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
For your information, copies of the Preface, Contents and Profile are attached.
Sincerely yours,
MOTEKI Hiromichi
Deputy Chairman and Secretary General
Tel 03-3519-4366
Fax 03-3519-4367
Email qzd13301@nifty.com